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Abstract
During the period 2006 to 2012, French competition authorities pressed charges against the country’s top 11
firms for engaging in a price-fixing cartel in the fresh dairy store brand segment. Using an empirical vertical
bargaining model, this paper studies the effects of the "yogurt cartel" on the price of store brand and national
brand products, on the profit sharing between dairy dessert companies and retailers, and consumer welfare. We
find that data supports collusive behavior in the dairy dessert market. The cartel leads to price effects for store
brands varying from 7.3% for other dairy desserts to 11.3% for yogurts, and those price effects would even be
stronger if the cartel also affects the ability of retailers to negotiate with manufacturers. We also show that in a
hypothetical situation without the collusion of private label providers, the prices of national brands would have
been higher and manufacturers’ profits for the sales of their national brand products would have been lower. The
cartel thus benefits manufacturers both in the national brand and private label markets. We show that the national
brand dairy dessert market should be taken into account when evaluating the damages to the private label dairy
dessert market, which the French competition authorities failed to do.
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1 Introduction
French competition authorities pressed charges against the country’s top 11 firms (March 2015) for engaging in
a price-fixing cartel in the fresh dairy product market, named the "yogurt cartel", for six years during the period
2006 to 2012 (involving yogurts, fresh cheese, liquid dairy cream and other dairy dessert sold under store brands).1
With the exception of Danone which do not produce dairy products sold under store brands, the ten main dairy
producers (among them Yoplait and Lactalis) were involved in fixing the price of supermarket own-brand dairy
desserts and cream. The cartel was uncovered thanks to a special procedure that allows companies to report their
own price-fixing activity to regulators in exchange for reduced punishment. Yoplait, majority-owned by US-based
General Mills Inc., was the first company to report the activity, and was given no fines in return for exposing the
cartel. The authorities found evidence on how companies agreed to price increases and divided up volumes (using
recovery or compensation volumes, volume freezing agreements or agreements on quotations in tenders). They
also found evidence that competing producers coordinated calls for tender, in order to strengthen the incumbent
producer position: they offered higher prices than the incumbent’s or ensured that the other producer sold the prod-
uct but compensated the incumbent firm that lost the contract. The French competition authorities thus concluded
that such a coordination in the fresh dairy product sector led to market sharing between firms, a non free market
pricing behavior, limiting the free exercise of competition. Concerned companies were thus severely fined with
a total amount of 192.7 million euros for their illegal coordination behavior for the entire cartel duration period.
Fines were computed on the basis of total national store brand sales in retail stores. Yoplait was totally exempted
from fines as the first applicant for leniency and thus escaped a fine of 44.7 million euros. Senagral, who faced a
penalty of 101.3 million euros, benefited from a reduction in the penalty as a secondary-ranked leniency applicant.
We refer to the definition of cartel in Levenstein and Suslow (2015), where cartels are seen as coordination be-
haviors between members aiming to reduce competition and increase profits through output restrictions or price
setting, which is prohibited by article 101(1) of the EC treaty for the functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
By setting up a cartel, dairy firms colluded explicitly to achieve a situation close to monopoly equilibrium in the
1Autorité de la concurrence: Décision 15-D-03 du 11 mars 2015 relative á des pratiques mises en œuvre dans le secteur des produits laitiers
frais
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private label (PL) market.2 Collusion in an industry leads to market price effects that deserve greater attention in
the literature. They are often measured as the increase in price caused by a sellers’ cartel compared to a competitive
benchmark market outcome (often called overcharge).3 Levenstein and Suslow (2015) found evidence that cartels
often form in response to falling prices for a particular good caused by different events occurring in a specific mar-
ket. It is worth noting that the anticompetitive behavior found in the dairy dessert market occurred in a particular
context, where the retail food sector had became concentrated.4 In fact, successive mergers have increased food
retail concentration during the last 30 years, which has increased the buying power of strong retail chains (see Al-
lain et al. (2017) and Dobson, Waterson, and Davies (2003)). To countervail the buying power of the retail sector,
manufacturers in many food markets –and in particular in the dairy market– have reinforced their bargaining posi-
tion with respect to retail chains through a vast consolidation movement in the early 2000s (European-Commission
(2014), OECD (2014)). Simultaneously, PLs were introduced in retail chains stores. The introduction of PLs by
retailers has differing strategic objectives. First, retailers do not sell identical PLs while national brands (NBs)
can be sold in different retail chains. This implies that PLs enable a retailer to differentiate between competing
retailers (Berges-Sennou, 2006) and relax competition. Second, PLs can be used to reinforce a retailer’s bargaining
position with respect to their suppliers, in order to improve its profit sharing in the vertical chain. The introduction
of the PLs –or the threat of their introduction– decreases the market power of NB suppliers, and hence the whole-
sale price negotiated with the NB manufacturers (see Mills (1995) for instance). According to Steiner (1990), the
relative power between producers and retailers depends on the loyalty of consumers to particular brands or stores.
The bargaining power of a retailer is reinforced when consumers are more willing to switch brands within a store
than stores within a brand. The substitution pattern between brands and retailers’ stores is thus a key feature when
analyzing the bargaining position in the vertical chain. Third, the retailers own and control their PLs; therefore,
they have the exclusive rights over the PL products. Then, if manufacturers want to enter the PL market, they will
have no/low bargaining power from their sales. In this case, they may have incentives to coordinate in order to
2 Private labels are store brands which can be sold under the retailer’s own name or a name created exclusively by the retailer.
3Connor and Bolotova (2006) define price-fixing overcharge as "a transfer of income or wealth from buyers to the members of the cartel
that occurs as a result of a collusive agreement. The overcharge rate is calculated by comparing actual cartel-enhanced price changes to some
competitive benchmark".
4We will refer to the dairy dessert market as the dairy market where the collusive behavior has been detected, that is, the yogurt, fresh cheese
and other dairy dessert market segments.
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increase their bargaining position. On the one hand, dairy firms may benefit from the cartel as PL dairy desserts
are a much less differentiated product compared to NB dairy desserts, which implies more intense competition
between PL providers in the absence of a cartel. On the other hand, the buyer power of retailers in the PL market
can limit the benefit to dairy firms of setting up a cartel, which limits their ability to increase prices.
Market power through collusion or mergers has been extensively analyzed in the literature (see for instance Ivaldi
and Verboven (2005)). Some articles deal with the food industries. For instance, Dubé (2005) simulated the effect
of hypothetical mergers in the carbonated soft drink in one particular US city (Denver) but where retailers were
considered as exogenous, such that their strategic behaviors were not taken into account. More generally, there are
few studies on the implication of collusive behavior on profit sharing in vertical chains. In this article, we follow
such a merger simulation methodology (Budzinski and Ruhmer (2009)) but we rather simulate a hypothetical non-
collusive situation, starting from a situation where food firms may behave anti-competitively towards retailers in
the food chain. As emphasized by Berto Villas-Boas (2007), "competition authorities should consider incorporat-
ing the role of retailers in upstream merger analyses, especially in the presence of increasingly consolidated retail
food markets". Bonnet and Dubois (2010) extend Berto Villas-Boas (2007) using a take-it-or-leave-it non-linear
contract framework but such a model cannot deal with profit sharing between manufacturers and retailers, and PL
markets are considered as perfectly integrated. Our merger analysis approach then follows a second strand of the
literature based on Nash bargaining game methodologies, as in Draganska, Klapper, and Villas-Boas (2010). Bar-
gaining frameworks have been widely used to analyze buyer-seller relationships in a number of different industries.
Such a methodology allows us to properly model the existence of retailers’ bargaining power in the wholesale price
decision and its incidence on profits, for both the food manufacturing and the retailing firms. In our framework,
manufacturers and retailers bargain bilaterally and simultaneously over linear wholesale price contracts without
observing the trading terms of other bilateral negotiations (secret contracts). Given the existence of interactions
between the NB and the PL markets, this paper studies the implications of the "yogurt cartel" on both the PL
and NB national markets and not only on the PL market, as has been done by the competition authorities. We
also assess profit sharing between retailers and manufacturers, and margins at both the manufacturer and retailer
levels for both NBs and PLs. Using a one year panel data of food purchases in France, we test for the collusive
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behavior of the PL providers. The availability of such a large and detailed panel data set that provides information
on product characteristics (brands, prices, purchase retail stores, etc.) enables us to estimate a sophisticated model
of collusion behavior (see Aguirregabiria and Slade (2017)), from which we infer the implication on final prices,
profit sharing and consumer welfare.
We find that the data supports collusive behavior in the dairy dessert market. The cartel leads to price effects
for PLs varying from 7.3% for dairy desserts to 11.3% for yogurts. Price effects on PL products are even stronger
if the cartel also affects the ability of the retailer to negotiate with the manufacturer when bargaining over the
wholesale price (bargaining weights). Interestingly, results show that it is important to consider the market for NB
dairy desserts, as the cartel also affects the prices of NBs and the margins at the manufacturer and retail levels.
Indeed, when simulating a no-collusion scenario, we find an umbrella effect at the wholesale level: the margins of
manufacturers for NB products would be higher under collusion such that manufacturers benefit both on the sales
of NBs and PLs through collusion. Indeed, when PL providers collude, they are able to reduce the share of PLs on
the market, which reduces the bargaining position of retailers. If the negotiation fails with NB manufacturers, the
profit they can make with the use of their PLs is lowered (the retailers’ disagreement payoff is reduced). However,
the umbrella effect does not show up at the retail level. We find that the higher NB wholesale prices are not
transmitted into higher NB final prices because of the differentiation strategies of retailers. Overall, retailers are
differently affected by the cartel. Finally, we also show that when the cartel can also change the ability of retailers
to negotiate with manufacturers, the impacts on prices and profits for both NBs and PLs are even stronger.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the dairy dessert market. We develop in Section 3
the empirical strategy for the evaluation of the cartel impacts on the dairy dessert market. In Section 4, we then
provide empirical results on the impact on prices, margins and surplus for manufacturers, retailers and consumers.
We conclude in Section 5.
2 Background on the "yogurt cartel" case and data description
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To be consistent with an analysis on the food chain up to consumer level, we focus on the dairy dessert market.
We exclude dairy creams from the analysis because the cream segment is a separate consumption market. In 2011,
dairy desserts accounted for around 16% of dairy product purchases in supermarkets and hypermarkets in France
(Agrimer, 2016). We use a 2009 home-scan data set from a French representative consumer panel data of 22,508
households and 1,348,946 purchases, collected by Kantar Worldpanel. It provides information on a product’s
characteristics, such as brand, dessert type such as yogurt, fresh cheese (quark and cream cheese) and other dairy
desserts, the retailer chain in which the purchases have been made, as well as price and quantity.
We consider the five main retail chains operating in the French grocery retailing sector for which the market share
varies from 9 to 20%, an aggregate of the remaining retailer chains that reach 12% of the total sales as well as an
aggregate of hard discounter (HD) chains. Hard discounters represent 11% of market shares in the dairy dessert
market and sell them at an average price (1.89 euro/kg), which is much lower than other retail chains, thus reflecting
the larger share of private labels in HD stores that is 82% (see Table 1). The retailers’ market share for PLs differs
from one retailer to another. The share of PLs varies between 40.4% (R4) to 60.8% (R2) for traditional retailers.
Both the size and the proportion of PL products in store will affect the impact of the cartel formation on retailers’
profit. Retailers offer a set of brands to consumers, including national brands and private labels for three categories
Table 1: Average price and market share by retailers
Price Market share PL market share
in euros per kg in % in %
Retailer 1. 2.27 16.19 8.09
Retailer 2 2.29 13.76 8.35
Retailer 3 2.44 9.58 3.93
Retailer 4 2.50 20.33 8.23
Retailer 5 2.55 12.24 7.19
Retailer 6 1.89 10.74 8.89
Retailer 7 2.45 11.77 4.92
of product; yogurt, fresh cheese and other dairy desserts, which accounts for 50%, 18% and 22% market share in
our sample, respectively.
The dairy dessert sector is highly concentrated in France. Danone, Yoplait, Senagral (Senoble), Lactalis (Nestlé)
and Novandie (Andros) are the main players in the NB markets, with very well-established brands, such as Danone
and Yoplait, for instance. These players are active and compete in the three categories of products where one or
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several brands compete.
Table 2: Average price and market share by brands
Category Price Market share
Yogurts Fresh Cheese Other desserts in euros per kg in %
Manufacturer 1 2.56 25.98
Brand 1 X 2.70 4.42
Brand 2 X 3.41 0.46
Brand 3 X 4.31 0.35
Brand 4 X 2.75 0.78
Brand 5 X 2.50 4.37
Brand 6 X 3.14 1.61
Brand 7 X 1.83 2.98
Brand 8 X X 2.49 3.24
Brand 9 X 2.55 7.77
Manufacturer 2 3.51 6.77
Brand 10 X X X 2.87 1.25
Brand 11 X X 4.13 3.55
Brand 12 X 3.18 0.92
Brand 13 X 2.51 1.06
Manufacturer 3 2.35 8.65
Brand 14 X X X 2.17 2.49
Brand 15 X 2.17 0.77
Brand 16 X 3.08 1.04
Brand 17 X 3.21 0.65
Brand 18 X 2.15 3.69
Manufacturer 4 3.99 1.30
Brand 19 X X X 3.99 1.30
Manufacturer 5 4.13 2.32
Brand 20 X X X 4.13 2.32
PL providers 1.97 49.59
PL- Other desserts X 2.72 11.84
PL- Fresh cheese X 2.08 11.15
PL- Yogurts X 1.58 26.60
Outside good 5.44
We include in the analysis the twenty main NBs produced by the five main manufacturers in France, among
which one manufacturer (M1) accounts for 26% of the market as shown in Table 2.5 Market shares at the brand
level are low with less than 3% of market shares, except for a few brands (brands 1, 5, 8, and 9 –all offered by
manufacturer 1–, 11, and 18). Brands 3 and 11 are the most expensive brands in the sample but brand 11 has a
large market share while brand 3 has a market share of less than 0.5%. Prices seem to be more dependent on the
category; they are the lowest on average for yogurt, varying from 1.81 to 3.25 euro/kg, and higher for the fresh
cheese category, varying from 2.92 to 5.45 euro/kg, and the other dairy dessert category, varying from 2.42 to
5For confidential reasons, we cannot link data to brand or firm names.
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6.33 euro/kg. They are then heterogeneous within categories, reflecting a high differentiation of products between
brands (flavor, ingredient, recipe, type of milk).
NB products compete with products sold under PL brands. PLs account for almost half of the market (49.6%).
The market share of PLs is higher in the fresh cheese sector with 60% of the total market share for this category
(see Table 3) and it is the lowest for the yogurt category with 48.5%. For the NBs, the price of the PL is the lowest
for the yogurt category followed by fresh cheese and then other dairy desserts. Prices of PLs are generally lower
than for NBs (see Table 2).
Other brands (brands provided by other dairy manufacturers) represent only a small market share. We aggregate
purchases of these other NBs in an outside good that represents 5.5% of the market, implying that consumers can
substitute one of the dairy dessert brands with this alternative option. Defining the choice alternative as a combina-
tion of a brand, a product category, and a retailer, we obtain 219 differentiated products that compete on the market.
Table 3: Average price and market share by categories for NB and PL products
Yogurts Fresh cheese Other dairy desserts
Price in euros par kg
NB 2.42 3.16 3.57
PL 1.58 2.08 2.72
Market share in %
NB 28.27 7.27 9.48
PL 26.60 11.15 11.84
3 Empirical strategy for the evaluation of the economic impact of the "yo-
gurt cartel"
Our empirical strategy for the evaluation of the economic impact of the "yogurt cartel" relies on a three-step
methodology. We first model the consumer behavior for dairy desserts using a structural model of demand that
allows for estimating substitution patterns between all 219 products. Using a structural supply model which takes
into account price contracting between manufacturers and retailers in the vertical chain, we then estimate bargain-
ing power and profit sharing. Modeling the procurement of PLs through a bargaining framework allows us to
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consider the possible existence of collusion in the market and allows for no or positive margins at the wholesale
level. With a call of tender, absent of collusion, price competition between manufacturers should lead to wholesale
PLs prices at the marginal production costs, and retailers should get the entire bilateral profit from the sales of PLs.
If data does not support all the bargaining power in the hand of retailers, then manufacturers in this sector are able
to extract some of the bilateral profits. We consider four possible model structures. In the two first models, we
consider bilateral negotiations between each retailer and its PL provider. In the first, we assume no coordination
among PL manufacturers, while in the second, we allow for possible collusion between PL manufacturers: one
manufacturer provides the PLs for all retailers. In the two alternative models, we consider a more extreme supply
structure –with and without collusion– where manufacturers can increase their bargaining power in the bilateral
negotiation, such that the PL manufacturing firms have all the bargaining power and have thus the ability to impose
the wholesale prices on retailers (take-it-or-leave-it offers by the PL manufacturers to retailers). Such a situation
can arise, for instance, when firms can get more information when colluding with competing manufacturers such
that they can extract more favorable terms in the contract. We find that the model where a "merged firm" negotiates
with retailers fits better with the data, meaning that some form of collusion between PL manufacturers prevails in
the market but not to the extent that they can extract all of the industry profit. Then, in the third stage, we simulate
a counterfactual scenario where collusion is removed to evaluate the potential impact of the collusion on prices
and profit sharing.
3.1 Demand Model
To moel the consumer behavior, we use a random coefficient logit model and we estimate the demand and the
related price elasticities. In such a random utility approach, we assume that the consumer chooses the product that
provides the highest utility. We suppose that the indirect utility funtion Vi jt for consumer i buying product j in
period t is given by:
Vi jt = βr( j)+βc( j)+αi jp jt + γNN jt + γLL jt + γCC jt + εi jt , (1)
where βc( j) and βr( j) are, respectively, category and retailer fixed effects that capture the (time invariant) un-
observed category and retailer characteristics, p jt is the price of product j in period t, αi j is the marginal disutility
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of the price for consumer i, N jt represents the percentage of plain items of the product j in period t, L jt represents
the percentage of diet items of the product j in period t, andC jt represents the percentage of chocolate items of the
product j in period t, and γN , γL and γC are the parameters associated, εi jt is an unobserved error term.
We assume that αi j varies across products and consumers. Indeed, consumers can have different price disutili-
ties depending on the product’s category. We assume that distributions of αi j have the following specification:
αi j = αc( j)+σανi, (2)
where vi follows a standard normal distribution and its cumulative distribution function is denoted respectively
by Pv(.). αc( j) represents the mean price sensitivity of consumers when they buy the product category c and σα
represents its deviation from the mean.
We can break down the indirect utility into a mean utility δ jt = βr( j)+βc( j)+α jp jt+γNN jt+γLL jt+γCC jt+ξ jt ,
where ξ jt captures all unobserved product characteristics and a deviation from this mean utility µi jt = p jtσανi. The
indirect utility is given by Vi jt = δ jt +µi jt + εi jt .
The consumer can decide not to choose one of the considered products. Thus, we introduce an outside option
that permits substitution between the considered products and a substitute. The utility of the outside good is
normalized to zero. The indirect utility of choosing the outside good is Vi0t = εi0t .
Assuming that εi jt is independently and identically distributed like an extreme value type I distribution, we are
able to write the market share of product j at period t in the following way:
s jt =
∫
A jt
(
exp(δ jt +µi jt)
1+∑Jtk=1 exp(δkt +µikt)
)
dPν(ν), (3)
where A jt is the set of consumers who have the highest utility for product j in period t, a consumer being
defined by the vector (νi,εi0t , ...,εiJt).
The random coefficient logit model generates a flexible pattern of substitutions between products that is driven
by the different consumer price disutilities αi j. Thus, the own- and cross-price elasticities of the market share s jt
can be written as:
∂ s jt
∂ pkt
pkt
s jt
=
{
− p jts jt
∫
αi jsi jt(1− si jt) φ(vi)dvi if j = k
pkt
s jt
∫
αiksi jtsikt φ(vi)dvi otherwise.
(4)
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3.2 Supply Model
We consider the dairy dessert vertical channel as a two-tier industry consisting of n f upstream firms and nr down-
stream retailers. Each upstream firm produces a set of goods G f and each downstream firm sells Rr products. We
consider a market that is composed of J differentiated products where a product is a brand in a product category
sold by a retailer. The marginal cost of producing a product j is denoted by µ j while the marginal cost at the retail
level is denoted c j. We denote as p j the retail price of the product j and w j its wholesale price. Retailers and
manufacturers’ profit are respectively given by Πr and Π f with:
Πr = ∑
j∈Rr
(p j−w j− c j)Ms j(p) (5)
Π f = ∑
j∈G f
(w j−µ j)Ms j(p), (6)
where the subscript t is omitted to simplify the notation and M is the total market size.
We follow Draganska, Klapper, and Villas-Boas (2010) and first derive the retail margins. We assume a
Bertrand-Nash competition game between retailers in the final dairy dessert market. Then, retail margins result
from the retailers’ choice of final prices. We then turn to the wholesale price equilibrium, which results from the
negotiation between firms and retailers. We assume that the negotiation on wholesale prices is modeled as a Nash
bargaining game where each pair of firms and retailers secretly, independently and simultaneously contract over
the wholesale price of the product j.6
Retail Bertrand-Nash equilibrium condition: each retailer r maximizes its profit Πr leading to the following
first-order condition:
sk(p)+ ∑
j∈Rr
(p j−w j− c j) ∂ s j(p)∂ pk = 0,∀k ∈ R
r. (7)
Using equation (7), the vector of retailer margins γ j = p j −w j − c j for retailer r can be written in matrix
notation:
γr = (IrSpIr)−1 Irs(p), (8)
6We assume that firms and retailers have rational expectations, such that the ultimate equilibrium outcome is anticipated by both parties. In
this case, the wholesale prices are determined independently of possible changes to retail prices as in (Draganska, Klapper, and Villas-Boas,
2010).
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where Ir is an ownership diagonal matrix (J×J)with element 1 if product j is sold by the retailer r and 0 otherwise,
Sp is the matrix (J×J) of the market share derivatives with respect to retail prices with general element ∂ s j(p)∂ pk , and
s(p) is the vector of market shares.
Wholesale price Nash bargaining solution: The bargaining for each product maximizes the two players’ joint
profit, taking as given all other negotiated contracts. Moreover, we assume that each player earns its disagreement
payoff (i.e., what it would earn from the sales of its other products if no agreement on this product is reached)
plus a share λ j ∈ [0,1] (respectively 1−λ j) of the incremental gain from trade going to the retailer (respectively
to the manufacturer). λ j is called the bargaining weight of the retailer with respect to the manufacturer on product
j and captures the ability of the retailers to negotiate with the manufacturers. We follow Draganska, Klapper, and
Villas-Boas (2010), and we assume that a manufacturer negotiates with a given retailer for each of its products,
and that each product is negotiated separately with the manufacturer. We also assume that retail prices are not
observable when bargaining over the wholesale prices. Then, retail prices are considered as fixed when solving for
the bargaining solution.7.
The equilibrium wholesale price for product j is derived from the bilateral bargaining problem between a firm
and a retailer such that each firm and retailer pair maximizes the Nash product:
[
pirj (w j)−drj
]λ j [pi fj (w j)−d fj ](1−λ j) , (9)
where pi fj (w j) and pi
r
j (w j) are, respectively, the profits of the firm and the retailer for product j. They are given
by:
pi fj (w j) = (p j−w j− c j)Ms j(p) = γ jMs j (p) (10)
pirj (w j) = (w j−µ j)Ms j(p) = Γ jMs j(p).
The payoffs the manufacturer and the retailer can realize outside of their negotiations are denoted, respectively,
by d fj and d
r
j . The retailer could gain d
r
j if it delists the supplier’s product j from its stores but contracts with other
suppliers. Similarly, the firm could get profits d fj from the sales of its other products as well as from the sales of
7We thus assume that manufacturers cannot precisely determine the retail price; which can be justified by the fact that retail price monitoring
is too costly for manufacturers see Iyer and Villas-Boas (2003))
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products to other retailers if the negotiation fails. If the retail prices are fixed during the negotiation process, the
disagreement payoffs d fj and d
r
j are given by:
drj = ∑
k∈Rr−{ j}
γkM∆s
− j
k (p) (11)
d fj = ∑
k∈G f−{ j}
ΓkM∆s
− j
k (p),
where the term ∆s− jk (p) is the change in market shares of product k that occurs when the product j is no longer sold
on the market. Those quantities can be derived through the substitution patterns estimated in the demand model as
follows:
∆s− jk (p) =
∫ exp(δkt +µikt)
1+∑Jtl=1\{ j} exp(δlt +µilt)
− exp(δkt +µikt)
1+∑Jtl=1 exp(δlt +µilt)
dPν(ν). (12)
Solving the bargaining problem in equation (9) leads to the following first-order condition:
λ j
(
pi fj −d fj
) ∂pirj (w j)
∂w j
+(1−λ j)
(
pirj −drj
) ∂pi fj (w j)
∂w j
= 0. (13)
Under the assumption that the matrix of prices for final commodities is treated as fixed when the wholesale
prices are decided during the bargaining process, we have
∂pirj (w j)
∂w j
=−Ms j(p) and ∂pi
f
j (w j)
∂w j
=Ms j(p) from equation
(10). Equation (13) can thus be written pi fj − d fj = 1−λ jλ j (pirj − drj). Using equations (10) and (11) the following
expression can be derived for the bargaining solution:
Γ jMs j(p)− ∑
k∈Rr−{ j}
ΓkM∆s
− j
k (p) =
1−λ j
λ j
γ jMs j (p)− ∑
k∈G f−{ j}
γkM∆s
− j
k (p)
 . (14)
.
Using equation (14) for all products j, we obtain the matrix of firms’ margins:
Γ=
n f
∑
f=1
(
I f SI f
)−1[ nr∑
r=1
1−λ
λ
∗ (IrSIr)γ
]
.8 (15)
8The ∗ means an element by element multiplication between the vectors 1−λλ and [(IrSIr)γ] .
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The vector of retail margins of general element γ = ∑nrr=1 (IrSpIr)
−1 Irs(p) is derived from equation (8), I f is
the (J×J) ownership diagonal matrix with element 1 if the products j is sold by the firm f and 0 otherwise, and S
is the (J× J) matrix with market shares as diagonal elements and changes in market shares otherwise:
S=

s1 −∆s−12 · · · −∆s−1J
−∆s−21 s2 · · · −∆s−2J
...
...
. . .
...
−∆s−J1 −∆s−J2 · · · sJ
 . (16)
Equation (15) shows the relationship between the wholesale margin on the one hand and the retail margin on
the other hand. This relationship first depends on the disagreement payoffs and thus on the market share changes
that are determined by the substitution patterns estimated in the demand model. It also depends on the exogenous
parameter λ j, that is, the ability of the retailer to negotiate with the firm over the wholesale price of the product j.
The higher λ j, the lower the share of the joint profit the firm will get from the bargaining.
Adding equations (15) and (8) yields the total margin of the firm/retailer pair over product j:
p− c−µ =
[
n f
∑
f=1
(
I f SI f
)−1[ nr∑
r=1
1−λ
λ
∗ (IrSIr)γ+ I
]]
(IrSpIr)
−1 Irs(p), (17)
where I is the (J× J) identity matrix and λ = (λ1, ...,λJ).
Because we do not directly observe firms’ marginal production costs as well as retailers’ marginal distribution
costs, we are not able to analytically determine the bargaining weight parameter λ j. Rather, we conduct an esti-
mation specifying the overall channel marginal cost C jt for each product j, which is the sum of the marginal cost
of production and the marginal cost of distribution for each product j at each period t. We follow the following
specification for the total marginal cost:
C jt = θω jt +η jt , (18)
where ω is a vector of cost shifters and η is a vector of error terms that accounts for unobserved shocks to marginal
cost. The final equation to be estimated is thus given by:
p= θω+
[
n f
∑
f=1
(
I f SI f
)−1[ nr∑
r=1
1−λ
λ
∗ (IrSIr)γ+ I
]]
(IrSpIr)
−1 Irs(p)+η . (19)
We are then able to get an estimate of λ for each product. Hence, we can deduce manufacturers’ margins from
equation (15). Moreover, from the estimates of the cost shifters and the error term of equation (19), we get the
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estimated total marginal cost. In practice, we use the price index of the raw milk as cost shifters to estimate the
equation (19), a dummy for the other dairy dessert category, the percentage of plain items and chocolate items that
could affect the cost, and manufacturer dummies.
Note that the model remains unchanged when we consider the merger case where only one PL manufacturer is
active on the market. The only difference is the number of manufacturers considered, which drops from 12 to six,
and the same manufacturer is negotiating with all retailers for the PL products. For the third and fourth cases, we
also consider a Nash Bargaining game for national brand products and the bargaining weights are recovered from
equation (19) only for national brands. Regarding private label products, we consider a take-it-or-leave-it offer
where either six PL manufacturers or a unique PL manufacturer proposes a contract for their PLs to retailers as in
Villas-Boas (2007).
In order to test the existence of a cartel between private label providers, we apply non nested tests between the
three supply models. Rivers and Vuong (2002) allows us to statistically determine the best supply model between
any two alternative models for which we have obtained total marginal costs. The test statistics are based on the
difference between the lack-of-fit criterion of each cost equation (18), obtained from the marginal cost function
(19) estimated for each model. 9
3.3 Impact of eliminating the cartel of private label providers
In this section, we simulate the fact that the cartel does not exist and that manufacturers of private label products
can no longer collude. We use the estimated marginal costs from the best supply contract model and the estimated
parameters from the demand model. We denote by Ct = (C1t , ..,C jt , ..,CJt) the vector of marginal costs for all
products in period t. To model the change in the structure of the industry, we assume that each retailer now
negotiates with an independent private label manufacturer for their PL and that the parameters λ have the same
values as in Table 5.10 As wholesale prices depend on retail prices, demand estimates, and the bargaining weight
between firms and retailers (as seen in equation (15)), we then only have to determine the vector of new equilibrium
9Details about the Rivers and Vuong test are provided in Bonnet and Dubois (2010).
10We also perform some robustness checks to see how the results will be changed if the bargaining weight is affected by the change in market
structure.
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retail prices consistent with the vector of estimated marginal costs. We solve the following program for each time
period:
min{
p∗jt
}
j=1,..,J
‖p∗t −Γ∗t (p∗t )− γ∗t (p∗t )−Ct‖ , (20)
where ‖.‖ is the Euclidean norm in RJ , and γ∗t and Γ∗t correspond respectively to the retailer and manufacturer
margins for the supply model where the private label producers do not collude.
4 Results
We estimate four models. In the first, named "NB no cartel", different manufacturers negotiate wholesale prices
for the PLs with retailers; in the second, "NB cartel", PL manufacturers act as a merged firm when negotiating
wholesale prices of PL products; in the third, "TL no cartel", different PL manufacturers make a take-it-or-leave-it
wholesale price contract offer to retailers for their PL products; and in the fourth scenario "TL cartel", a merged
PL manufacturer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer.
Table 4: Rivers and Vuong test
NB cartel TL no cartel TL cartel
NB no cartel -3.8 28.2 3.8
NB cartel 28.5 28.4
TPT no cartel 5.9
Note: Value are the test statistics of model "in row" against model "in column"
The Rivers and Vuong’s test shows that "NB cartel" is the best supply model, as the test statistics is higher
than the critical value of 1.64 (for a 5% significance) with models "TPT no cartel" and "TPT cartel" and the test
statistics is lower than the critical value of -1.64 (for a 5% significance) with model "NB no cartel" as shown in
Table 4.11 Using this model as a baseline, we then simulate the absence of the cartel and by comparison with the
baseline scenario, we will be able to assess the effect of the cartel in terms of prices, profits and consumer welfare.
11Note that if the market structure of the NB cartel model is not exactly the observed situation, it is the structure which is the closest to the
situation observed.
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4.1 Demand and supply estimates
The estimation results of the demand and supply models corresponding to the "NB cartel" model are summarized
in Table 5.12 From the demand estimates, we are able to compute demand own-price elasticities at the brand level.
They are heterogeneous among brands, varying from 3.6 to 7.7 for NBs and 3.2 and 5.8 for PLs in absolute values.
They are relatively high as they are calculated at a very disaggregated level. At the category level they are lower
at least for yogurt (2.45) and other dairy desserts (3.4) and remain high for fresh cheese (5.4). This indicates that
many substitutions occur between brands and categories. At the aggregate level, the own-price demand elasticity
for NB products is slightly higher than for PLs in absolute value (2.3 and 1.9 respectively). Another interesting
result is that substitution between NB products and PL products is asymmetric. The cross-price elasticity of the
demand of NB products with respect to the PL price is 2.48 while the cross-price elasticity of the PL products with
respect to the NB price is 1.87. This means that NB products are more sensitive to a change in PL prices than PL
products are when the prices of NB products change. Then, if the cartel removal leads to a decrease in the prices
of PLs, it will also affect the demand for NB products and their prices.
Estimates of the supply model show that the bargaining weight is on average in favor of manufacturers for
NBs, as expected. As a result, margins are higher (and even much higher for many of them) for manufacturers for
all brand products, except for brands 7, 13, 14 and 18 (see Figure1). For PLs, one may expect bargaining weights
to be in favor of retailers. However, our results suggest that the bargaining weight is in favor of the retailers in the
yogurt category (0.9) only, but this result is not true for the fresh cheese and other dairy dessert categories. For
these two categories, manufacturers indeed have more bargaining weight than retailers. For those categories, the
percentage margins for manufacturers are more than twice the margins for retailers (brands 21, 22 in Figure 1)
while percentage margins for products in the yogurt category (brand 23 in Figure 1) are higher for retailers.13 This
reflects the expected result that retailers could obtain lower supply prices in the absence of collusion. Actually, if
we compare the total profit sharing between retailers and manufacturers, profit sharing on PL products is in favor
of retailers for yogurt (53 %) while it is in favor of manufacturers for the other categories (27% and 25%).
12In the Appendix, we provide the estimation methodology of the demand and the related results.
13This result is consistent with results on percentage margins for PLs found in the literature summarized in Chakraborty (2018).
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Table 5: Results of the demand and supply estimates
Own-price Retail Bargaining Manufacturer marginal
elasticities margins weight∗ margins costs
(%) λ (%) (C/kg)
Brand 1 -4.27 26.79 0.44 37.26 0.93
Brand 2 -7.94 15.49 0.19 59.23 0.84
Brand 3 -8.63 14.04 0.16 64.95 0.88
Brand 4 -7.13 17.52 0.24 51.00 0.86
Brand 5 -5.73 20.96 0.40 33.13 1.11
Brand 6 -7.63 16.13 0.23 49.14 1.05
Brand 7 -3.58 32.49 0.92 12.24 0.97
Brand 8 -4.58 26.69 0.55 27.72 1.07
Brand 9 -4.21 27.20 0.48 32.80 0.99
Brand 10 -5.01 24.35 0.53 29.48 1.19
Brand 11 -6.15 19.46 0.31 47.68 1.23
Brand 12 -6.39 18.69 0.31 41.05 1.24
Brand 13 -4.15 27.65 0.62 21.33 1.22
Brand 14 -4.35 28.98 0.83 17.63 1.04
Brand 15 -6.16 20.31 0.37 35.77 0.92
Brand 16 -7.59 16.24 0.23 50.09 1.01
Brand 17 -7.67 16.07 0.23 50.73 1.03
Brand 18 -3.90 29.58 0.82 14.61 1.15
Brand 19 -5.69 21.27 0.26 59.00 0.70
Brand 20 -5.75 21.91 0.31 54.97 0.79
PL- Other desserts -5.83 19.79 0.30 56.50 0.61
PL- Fresh cheese -5.99 20.28 0.32 56.26 0.47
PL- Yogurts -3.24 34.70 0.89 30.83 0.53
∗ Bargaining weights correspond to the power of retailer relative to the manufacturer in the bilateral relationship
when bargaining over the wholesale price.
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Figure 1: Margin and marginal cost estimates
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4.2 Impact of anticompetitive practices on the fresh dairy product market
To evaluate the impact of collusion between PL manufacturers on the economy, we evaluate the impact on quantity
and prices for PLs and for NBs. The first column of Table 7 provides new retail prices per brand when the
bargaining weights are not affected by a change in the industry structure, such that the bargaining weight values
used in the simulation for PLs correspond to the estimated bargaining weights λˆ (see Table 5). The non collusion
scenario when bargaining weights are unchanged leads to a price reduction for PLs from 7.3% for other dairy
desserts to 11.3% for yogurts. The percentage reduction is stronger for the yogurt sector. In this category, the
bargaining weight for retailers is high (0.89 in average). Then, retailers pay a much lower wholesale price for their
PLs without collusion (a decrease in PL margins for yogurts by more than 70 percent as shown in Table 6), which
allows them to further reduce the final prices of PL yogurts (a reduction in the double marginalization effect). On
the contrary, the effect of the cartel is lower for other dairy desserts and fresh cheese categories as the bargaining
weight is in favor of manufacturers.
We can expect that collusion may also have changed relative bargaining weights, that is the ability to negotiate
between retailers and manufacturers. We are not able to estimate the possible change in bargaining weights.14
However, we can analyze how the results are changed if non-collusion behavior results in higher bargaining weights
for retailers. We consider two possible cases. First, we examine a case (column 2 of Table 7), where retailers have
at least the same bargaining weight as manufacturers (λ = 0.5 if λˆ < 0.5), and then the extreme case (column 3 of
Table 7), where retailers recover a full bargaining weight (λ = 1). In this extreme case, PL wholesale prices are
set up at wholesale marginal costs. A higher bargaining weight enables retailers to achieve larger price reductions
for fresh cheese and other dairy desserts sold under store brands.
The price effect on PLs leads to important changes in market shares of PL products (see Table 6). As expected,
lower PL retail prices lead to higher market shares for PLs. Note that the percentage of variation is high for PL
fresh cheese and other dairy desserts but the estimated market share for PLs is much lower for these two categories
compared to the market share of PL yogurts. With no collusion, manufacturers’ margins for PLs decrease as
expected, with a loss ranging from 26% to 77%. More interestingly, the change in retailers’ margins for PLs is
14We have J equations and J unknowns in equation (20). Therefore, we cannot estimate any additional parameters, as the new bargaining
weight that may result from a change in the structure of the industry.
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Table 6: Impact of the no collusion scenario on market shares, margins and firms’ profits (in percentage)
National brands Private labels
Yogurts Fresh cheese Other desserts Yogurts Fresh cheese Other desserts
λ = λˆ
Price 0.73 0.54 1.74 -11.31 -9.28 -7.31
Market share -19.24 -16.99 -13.00 15.02 43.58 30.19
Margins
Retailer 3.52 1.91 3.49 -1.87 -1.38 -1.51
Manufacturer -5.78 -0.29 0.74 -77.39 -33.47 -26.24
Total margin 0.77 0.35 2.14 -36.51 -24.77 -19.76
Profits
Retailer -17.10 -15.44 -9.44 12.60 41.04 28.05
Manufacturer -21.36 -16.70 -7.56 -71.65 -3.84 -2.64
Industry -19.14 -16.39 -8.06 -26.77 8.17 5.18
λˆ or 0.50 if λˆ < 0.50
Price 0.34 0.53 2.28 -7.36 -12.84 -14.19
Market share -27.13 -25.79 -17.40 -15.69 55.11 80.94
Margins
Retailer 4.27 2.59 5.10 -0.75 -2.64 -4.79
Manufacturer -9.16 -0.67 1.19 -82.29 -68.47 -70.16
Total margin 0.23 0.28 3.16 -38.12 -50.77 -53.36
Profits
Retailer -25.51 -24.58 -12.51 -16.35 49.68 72.61
Manufacturer -29.06 -26.52 -8.39 -8.38 -51.60 -47.01
Industry -27.20 -26.04 -9.45 -47.81 -24.44 -16.50
λˆ = 1
Price -0.00 0.19 2.93 -10.81 -19.10 -17.96
Market share -37.71 -35.70 -15.76 -24.70 100.29 97.01
Margins
Retailer 6.99 3.97 7.66 -0.46 -3.50 -5.17
Manufacturer -10.68 -0.09 2.38 - - -
Total margin 1.48 1.09 5.08 -46.65 -73.95 -75.50
Profits
Retailer -35.50 -34.14 -11.36 -25.38 94.52 87.81
Manufacturer -38.94 -36.50 -2.80 - - -
Industry -37.14 -35.92 -5.07 -60.21 -47.85 -52.00
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Table 7: Change in prices per brand in the no collusion scenarios (in percentage).
Bargaining weights
λˆ λˆ or 0.50 λ = 1
if λˆ < 0.50
Brand 1 2.76 3.56 5.12
Brand 2 1.36 2.99 2.97
Brand 3 1.27 2.45 5.06
Brand 4 -0.01 -0.45 -0.01
Brand 5 0.04 -0.51 -1.22
Brand 6 0.31 0.22 0.57
Brand 7 -1.29 -2.09 -2.83
Brand 8 0.45 0.16 -0.47
Brand 9 0.90 0.86 0.83
Brand 10 1.77 2.40 2.08
Brand 11 2.05 2.27 4.13
Brand 12 1.22 1.64 2.68
Brand 13 0.81 -0.00 3.08
Brand 14 0.71 0.51 -0.68
Brand 15 -0.38 -0.85 -3.00
Brand 16 0.86 0.69 -0.05
Brand 17 0.84 1.20 1.35
Brand 18 -0.52 -1.16 -1.42
Brand 19 5.92 8.50 7.81
Brand 20 2.17 2.48 3.18
PL- Other desserts -7.31 -14.19 -17.96
PL- Fresh cheese -9.28 -12.84 -19.10
PL Yogurts -11.31 -7.36 -10.81
Consumer surplus +0.25 +0.45 +0.73
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also (slightly) negative, meaning that retailers do not perfectly transmit the decrease in PL wholesale prices to
consumers. It follows that PL providers’ profits are lower in the no cartel situation with the higher profit loss for
the yogurt category, while retailers’ profits on PL products are higher. As shown in Figure 2, the total industry
profits for PLs increase in the no cartel situation for fresh cheese and other dairy dessert categories but not for
yogurt. For this later category, the loss of PL providers is too high and cannot be compensated for by the gain
in retailers’ profits. This result is due to the high bargaining weight of retailers with respect to PL providers, as
explained previously.15
Figure 2: Impact of the non collusion scenario on manufacturers and retailers’ profits
We denote by NB and PL national brand and private label products, respectively.
We denote Y, FC, and D the yogurt, fresh cheese, and other dairy dessert categories.
Finally, we denote C and NC as the cartel and non-cartel scenarios.
Changes in PL prices will also affect the NB market. The theory (umbrella effect) predicts that when removing
15We can see in Table 6 that the same effect is obtained for fresh cheese and other dairy dessert PL products when the bargaining weight of
those PL products is increased.
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collusion, the increase in PL market shares should lead to a drop in the demand for NBs and thus NB prices (see
Inderst, Maier-Rigaud, and Schwalbe (2014), for instance). We should see this outcome on NB market shares and
prices, as NBs act as (imperfect) substitutes of PL products on the market. We find a lower market share for NBs
(see Table 6) with the highest decrease for the yogurt category (-19%) but not a decrease in the average final prices
in each category.16 Contrary to what may be expected, final prices slightly increase (by 0.54% for the fresh cheese
category to 1.74% for the other dairy dessert category). Nevertheless, we observe a decrease in wholesale prices for
NBs when the collusion is removed, as the manufacturers’ margins are reduced (except for the other dairy dessert
category), which is consistent with the umbrella effect. Indeed, when PL providers collude, they are able to reduce
the share of PLs on the market, which reduces the bargaining position of retailers: if the negotiation fails with NB
manufacturers, the profit they can make with the use of their PLs is lowered (the retailers’ disagreement payoff is
reduced). There is an additional effect linked to the strategic reaction of retailers with respect to NBs. The NB
wholesale price reduction is not translated into lower NB final prices. They provide both the NB and PL products
on their shelves, which are differentiated. They thus have the incentive to charge higher NB price to take advantage
of consumer segmentation (see Dobson and Chakraborty (2015)). By lowering PL prices and increasing NB prices,
retailers can attract more consumers who are sensitive to low-priced products and increase the consumption of PL
products, while extracting as high a price as possible from consumers who are more sensitive to NB brands. It
results in the total industry margin (defined as the final price minus production and distribution costs) being higher
under the non collusion scenario at the benefit of retailers for NB products. Globally, retailers’ and manufacturers’
profits on the NB markets are lower because of the decrease in market shares, such that the total industry profit
decreases on the NB market (see Figure 2).
While manufacturers are clearly negatively affected by the impact of removing the cartel both on NB and PL
products, the impact of profits is much more balanced for retailers. They lose profits on NBs but gain on the PL
categories, such that the profit the retailers can gain when the collusion stops can be partially or totally offset by
changes in the NB market (Table 8). However, the impact on retailers’ profits differ from one retailer to another.
We find that profits increase for retailers 5 and 6 by more than 2% whereas they slightly decrease for all other
16However, the impact of collusion on the prices of NB products is heterogeneous, varying from -1.29 to +5.9, which is the result of the
substitution pattern between products.
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retailers in the absence of collusion between PL manufacturers.17 However, at the global retail level, the effect
of the no-collusion scenario is very small and even slightly negative, as shown in Table 8. At the total industry
level, the no-collusion scenario leads to a reduction in the total industry profits which is mainly due to the negative
impact on NBs.
The more the bargaining weight is in favor of retailers for PLs, the larger the impact on PL market shares, such
that the market and profits effects discussed above are reinforced as shown in Table 6: the qualitative results are
unchanged while the magnitude of changes differ.
Finally, we find that removing the cartel benefits consumers as expected but the gain is relative low, even
when the bargaining weights of retailers increase. The reason why this effect is not higher is linked with the
counterbalancing impact on NB product prices (see Table 6). To conclude, it seems that the cartel does not affect
consumers too much. It benefits PL manufacturers, but also large NB manufacturers, which have benefited from
a spillover effect on to NBs. Retailers are not greatly affected by the cartel as they have indirectly benefited from
higher profits for NB products.
Table 8: Impact of the no collusion scenario on firms’ profits in millions of euros
National brands Private labels
λ = λˆ
Retailer -63.6 63.5
Manufacturer -110.8 -79.2
Industry -174.4 -15.6
λˆ or 0.50 if λˆ < 0.50
Retailer -94.6 86.4
Manufacturer -150.7 -290.3
Industry -245.4 -203.9
λˆ = 1
Retailer -123.3 112.8
Manufacturer -178.8 -537.0
Industry -302.2 -424.2
17Profits decrease respectively by 0.09%, 2.18%, 0.48%, 0.54% and 0.75% for retailers 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7 and increase by 2.63% and 2.39%
for retailers 5 and 6.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a three-step methodology to investigate the effects of the "yogurt cartel" in France on
the dairy dessert market and assess the effect on prices and welfare of such a cartel. The methodology consists of
developing a structural demand and supply model and testing alternative supply models where PL manufacturers
can collude (or not). We find empirical evidence for collusive behaviour between PL providers. Using the empirical
results on demand and supply, we simulate a non-collusive counterfactual scenario and find that PL prices would
effectively decrease as expected. In addition, we highlight the indirect effects on the NB products and show that
the umbrella effect leads to a decrease in NB wholesale prices which would not be transmitted to final prices. On
the contrary, it seems that retailers would have an incentive to segment even more the NB and PL markets such that
NB prices would even increase. Regarding profit, we find that not only PL providers but also NB manufacturers
lose when the cartel is dismantled. Due to strategic reaction on NB and PL segments, retailers were not so much
affected by the cartel. This means that PL providers (that are also suppliers of NBs) would gain from the cartel
not only on PL products but also on NB products. This result gives new perspectives for competition policy and
the analysis of cartels’ anticompetitive practices in the food manufacturing and retailing sectors. We highlight
the fact that competition authorities should take into account the effect on NB products as well, which has not
been the case in the "yogurt cartel" situation. Indeed, the French competition authorities only take into account
the damages for PL products while the damages could be different when taking into account the NB dairy dessert
market. The competition between NB and PL products reduces the impact of the collusive behaviour for both
retailers and consumers. The methodology we provide in this article could be more generally used for analysing
collusive practices in vertically related industries and to infer the impacts for both providers and sellers. The limit
of the analysis however is that, with the available data, it would be a challenge to precisely identify the providers
of PLs for each retailer. Such data would allow us to develop models that take into account the joint procurement
of PLs and NBs and identify the true impact for each provider.
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6 Appendices
6.1 Demand: estimation method and results
To estimate the set of demand parameters, we maximize the log likelihood function which can be written as
LL(θ) = ∑Ii=1 ln(Pi jt) where Pi jt =
∫
si jtdPν(ν) is the unconditional probability for household i to buy product j
at time t and si jt =
exp(δ jt+µi jt )
1+∑Jtk=1 exp(δkt+µikt )
.
When unobserved heterogeneity in household preferences is introduced via random parameters, the choice
probabilities no longer have a closed-form expression. The log likelihood function is an integral that can be
difficult to solve analytically. In this case, the Simulated Maximum likelihood method is used as in Revelt and
Train (1997). We estimate the demand model (1) using a random subsample of 100,000 observations.
This estimation method relies on the assumption that all product characteristics X jt are independant of the error
term εi jt in the utility function (1). However, assuming εi jt = ξ jt+ ei jt where ξ jt is a product-specific error term
varying across periods and ei jt is an individual specific error term, the independence assumption cannot hold if
unobserved factors included in ξ jt (and hence in εi jt ) such as promotions, displays, and advertising are correlated
with observed characteristics X jt . For instance, we do not know the amount of advertising that firms expend each
month for their brands. This effect is thus included in the error term because advertising might play a role in the
choice of dairy desserts by households. As advertising is an appreciable share of dairy dessert production costs, it
is obviously correlated with prices. To solve the problem that omitted product characteristics might be correlated
with prices, we use a two-stage residual inclusion approach as in Petrin and Train (2010) and Terza, Basu, and
Rathouz (2008). We then regress prices on instrumental variables as well as exogenous variables of the demand
equation:
p jt =Wjtγ+κr( j)+κc( j)+ τNN jt + τLL jt + τCC jt +η jt (21)
where Wjt is a vector of input price variables, γ is the vector of associated parameters, η jt is an error term that
captures the remaining unobserved variations in prices, and κc( j), κr( j), N jt , L jt andC jt are the exogenous variables
from the demand equation. The estimated error term η̂ jt of the price equation includes some omitted variables such
as advertising variations, promotions, and shelf displays that are not captured by the other exogenous variables of
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the demand equation and by the cost shifters. Introducing this term in the mean utility of consumers δ jt allows us
to capture unobserved product characteristics varying across time. Prices are now uncorrelated with the new error
term ξ jt + ε jht −piη̂ jt . We then write:
δ jt = βr( j)+βc( j)+α jp jt + γNN jt + γLL jt + γCC jt +ξ jt+piη̂ jt (22)
where pi is the estimated parameter associated with the estimated error term of the first stage.
In practice, we use the price indexes for the main inputs used in the production of dairy desserts, that is, raw
milk and packaging. Cost variables in equation (22) include the price indexes of cow milk, and plastic as it is
unlikely that input prices are correlated with unobserved determinants of demand for dairy desserts.18 The dairy
dessert industry only represents a very small share of the demand for those inputs, which justifies the absence of a
correlation between input prices and unobserved determinants of the demand for fluid milks. The raw milk price
index is interacted with the manufacturer dummies because we expect that manufacturers obtain different prices
from suppliers for raw materials . Estimation results of the price equation (22) are presented in Table 9. We can
see that the instruments are not weak since the F-test show that instruments are statistically significant. The results
of the demand estimation are presented in Table 10.
18These indexes are provided by the French National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies.
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Table 9: Results on price equation
Coefficient (standard error)
Cow milk -0.91 (0.42)**
Cow milk ×M2 0.94 (0.16)***
Cow milk ×M3 -0.93 (0.15)***
Cow milk ×M4 2.49 (0.20)***
Cow milk ×M5 5.36 (0.20)***
Cow milk ×M6 -2.73 (0.19)***
Plastic 0.018 (0.00)***
Retailer fixed Effects
R1 -0.11 (0.05)**
R2 0.07 (0.05)
R3 0.00 (0.05)
R4 0.09 (0.05)*
R5 0.37 (0.05)***
R6 -0.31 (0.06)***
Category fixed Effects
Yogurts 0.84 (0.75)
Fresh cheese 2.05 (0.75)***
Other dairy desserts 1.75 (0.75)**
Plain (N jt ) -0.85 (0.06)***
Diet (L jt ) -0.17 (0.05)***
Chocolate (C jt ) 0.41 (0.09)***
F-test of IVs 205.75∗∗∗ (0.00)
R-squared 0.94
Number of observations 2,628
∗∗∗significant at 1%; ∗∗significant at 5%;∗significant at 10%
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Table 10: Demand results
Coefficient (standard error)
Price × Yogurts -1.81 (0.00)***
Price × Fresh cheese -2.88 (0.00)***
Price × Other dairy desserts -2.46 (0.00)***
Std Price 0.84 (0.00)***
Error term 1.86 (0.00)***
Retailer fixed Effects
R1 0.24 (0.00)***
R2 0.22 (0.00)***
R3 0.37 (0.00)***
R4 0.92 (0.00)***
R5 0.66 (0.00)***
R6 -0.43 (0.00)***
Category fixed Effects
Yogurts 2.66 (0.00)***
Fresh cheese 6.54 (0.00)***
Other dairy desserts 5.93 (0.00)***
Plain (N jt ) -1.35 (0.00)***
Diet (L jt ) -0.33 (0.00)***
Chocolate (C jt ) 1.68 (0.00)***
LL 331,663
Number of observations 100,000
∗∗∗significant at 1%; ∗∗significant at 5%;∗significant at 10%
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